martes, 11 de abril de 2017

The cybersecurity of the Spanish industry is a farce, and the attacks are being shot

The cybersecurity of the Spanish industry is a farce, and the attacks are being shot
The cybersecurity of the Spanish industry is a farce, and the attacks are being shot

From his home, hacker Amador Aparicio could open the floodgates that empty the retirement pond. or change the pool temperature of a luxury hotel. Spain is the fifth country in the world with more systems that control all kinds of installations and industrial processes connected to the Internet, most without any protection. The most sensitive, critical infrastructures, are being harshly ciberatacados, with an increase of 357% last year. And, according to experts, this figure is short.

Amador Aparicio usually lectures on cybersecurity. I was preparing one, about industrial control systems, when I ended up with the stuff I could do at a distance, how to start the crematory furnaces of a morgue, decide from what ambient temperature the heating of a higher school will start, or to disable the alarms that warn of excessive pressure in the boiler of a block of houses.

These cyber are also quite easy, says Amador: "If you want to locate unsafe industrial control systems, the first thing is to know the manufacturer and, with this data, go to a finder of devices connected to the Internet as Shodan". In seconds, Shodan displays a list of vulnerable systems, including its GPS location.

The following is to get the ' software ' management that uses the device you want to attack, to install it on the computer itself, so that the computer of the hacker and the attacked device "speak the same language". According to Amador, these programs can be obtained many times on the same page of the manufacturer, which is poorly protected and allows to unload what one wants.

"The last step is to connect to the device," explains the investigator, something also relatively easy because, he says, "many devices that control industrial processes or critical systems do not present any type of security Configuration". Once inside, you can modify the operation of the device, either changing the parameters that start the system (for example to make it activate from the temperature you want), or modify the information you have in memory, to do unexpected things.

Without knowledge or without care

Aparicio blamed this lack of security that "the operator who put them on the internet did not have the knowledge or has not thought that anyone can access." Other devices are protected, but "with the default data that shows the documentation", data that anyone who has read the manual can know. Another problem, says the investigator, is that "each manufacturer uses its own protocols, insecure on some occasions, and there is no standardization when integrating them."

José Valiente, director of the Center for Industrial Cybersecurity (ITC), adds: "There are a growing number of automated and externally connected processes and installations, in many cases over the Internet;" "Everything has increased in industrial automation, complexity, use and exposure of systems, but cybersecurity is not the same."

The fifth country with more connected systems

Spain is the fifth country in the world with more industrial control systems connected to the Internet, 3,059 when it comes to writing this article. But how many securely? In this context, the essential service operators and critical infrastructures are particularly concerned. Malicious hackers could poison our water, sabotage nuclear power plants or leave us without light, just to put examples that have already happened in other countries.

Last year, 479 cybersecurity incidents were detected in critical infrastructures located in Spain, an increase of 357% compared to 2015 according to the National Center for the Protection of critical infrastructures (CNPIC), that relativizes this alarming fact: "in 2016 has increased the number of critical operators, also the capabilities of the cert of security and industry and the level of confidence in their relationships with critical operators" , which has resulted in an increase in notifications. "

Still, the increase is remarkable and that, says José Valiente, "have not detected 10% of the incidents that are occurring." The probes that collect these data analyse only 10% of the traffic of a hundred critical operators, explains the director of ITC. "If Inspeccionasen the other 90% of traffic we would be talking about more than 4,000 incidents in only these 100 operators". And if we include all essential service operators, more than 5,000 in Spain, "then we would talk about at least 100,000 technological incidents," says Valiente.

The critical services most attacked in Spain are, according to a study by ITC that will soon see the light, "the health sector, which has registered more than 40,000 incidents;" "followed by energy, due to the use of very recent technology in the smart grid."

The ' annual National Security Report 2016 ' highlights that the incidents of cybersecurity in Renfe "have experienced an exponential increase", but the director of ITC clarifies it: "The transport sector in Spain is one of the best security level has, especially the aeronautical." The ITC study has evaluated different sectors and, according to Valiente, RENFE obtains the best qualification.

The power grid is the big concern

But the great concern of Western governments is the power grid. And his nightmare is to suffer a attack like that that left seven hours without light to Ukraine in a cold December of 2015. Could this happen here? "Once such incidents occur, it is difficult for them to repeat themselves, but the measures to ensure that they are not replicated are not adopted within a few months, so I do believe it would be possible," says ITC director.

A virus called BlackEnergy played an important role in the attack on Ukraine and, according to sources of Cnpic, certainly viruses and malicious programs are responsible for most attacks against Spanish critical infrastructures. Their goal is usually to steal information, blackmail (case of ' ransomware ') or manipulate legitimate programs.

The most frequent incidents are those that leave no trace (for example, theft of information) that we do not discover until past months, years, or never

The second large group of incidents against critical systems detected by the cnpic are the bombardments or "denial of service Attacks", whose intention is that the service stops working. Like all over the world, in 2016 have rebounded the attacks of ' ransomware ' and ' fraud to the CEO ' also in the Spanish critical operators. In addition, they explain from the cnpic, "from the hand of Europol several collaborations were carried out in the fight against the botnets". Fortunately, they congratulate themselves, "all incidents were detected, managed and resolved in time."

Other observers are not so optimistic. From ITC They remember that the statistics we know are of visible things, like attacks that cause a fall of the service or a malfunction, but the most frequent incidents are those that leave no trace, the theft of information, the alteration of a ' software ', a service, etc., that we do not discover until months, years, or never have passed, says Valiente.

The case of the United States

In the United States, the defense of its electrical network and experts working on it are taking a particularly serious view of the vision of Valiant, as Michael Assante: "We are entering an ERA in which more actors are able to have the right skills, energy engineering in addition to cyber engineering and access skills." This leads to very targeted attacks against critical systems that may take weeks or months to be detected.

The attribution of these attacks is very difficult, they assure our sources of the cnpic, but if it is possible to see that "the complexity and sophistication of the attacks increases year after year", this implies that after them there is not an isolated individual but, according to the Cnpic, "highly structured organizations, with specialization in the different tasks necessary to build a attack and invest a great amount of resources". Attacks of these dimensions can only be borne by millionaires, large corporations or governments.

In this league, the defense also requires the strength of a government and it is fair to say that the Spanish is quickly getting the batteries. As a token, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, the National Plan for the protection of critical infrastructures, the creation of agencies such as the early Warning service for industrial systems or the new cybersecurity coordination centres in RENFE and port authorities, or the collaboration of public and private actors in environments such as the cybersecurity coordinating table and the production of documentation such as the "Ciberincidentes Report guide for critical Operators".

0 comentarios: